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Abstract
ZFC has sentences that quantify over all sets or all ordinals, without restriction. Some have argued that sen-
tences of this kind lack a determinate meaning. We propose a set theory called TOPS, using Natural Deduction,
that avoids this problem by speaking only about particular sets.
1 Introduction
ZFC has long been established as a set-theoretic foundation of mathematics, but concerns about its meaningfulness
have often been raised. Specifically, its use of unrestricted quantifiers seems to presuppose an absolute totality of
sets. The purpose of this paper is to present a new set theory called TOPS that addresses this concern by speaking
only about particular sets. Though weaker than ZFC, it is adequate for a large amount of mathematics.
To explain the need for a new theory, we begin in Section 2 by surveying some basic mathematical beliefs and
conceptions. Section 3 presents the language of TOPS, and Section 4 the theory itself, using Natural Deduction.
Section 5 adapts the theory to allow theorems with free variables.
Related work is discussed in Section 6. While TOPS is by no means the first set theory to use restricted
quantifiers in order to avoid assuming a totality of sets, it is the first to do so using Natural Deduction, which turns
out to be very helpful. This is apparent when TOPS is compared to a previously studied system [26] that proves
essentially the same sentences but includes an inference rule that (we argue) cannot be considered truth-preserving.
What saves TOPS from this pitfall is its use of Natural Deduction.
We sum up the paper’s argument in Section 7.
2 Motivating TOPS
2.1 Beliefs abut bivalence and definiteness
Before trying to determine whether a given sentence is true or false, one might wonder whether it has a truth value
at all. A bivalent sentence is one that has an objective, determinate truth value (True or False)—regardless of
whether anyone can ever know it.
Which mathematical sentences are bivalent? This is a contentious question, and there are various schools of
thought. We shall consider in turn the languages of Peano arithmetic, second and third order arithmetic, and ZFC.
In each of these, a sentence φ is built from atomic formulas using connectives and quantifiers. It is reasonable to
say that φ is bivalent if the range of each quantifier is definite, i.e. clearly defined, with no ambiguity or haziness.
So we examine each of our languages in the light of this principle.
• Arithmetical sentences, such as the Goldbach Conjecture, quantify over the set N = {0, 1, . . .} of natural
numbers. The conception of N is “most restrictive”, allowing only what is generated by zero and successor.
It is generally considered obvious (though finitists would disagree) that N is definite and so arithmetical
sentences are bivalent. Let us accept this view and continue.
• Second order arithmetical sentences quantify over PN, or equivalently the set 2N of ω-sequences of booleans.
While some people (call them countabilists) believe in N but not in 2N—see e.g. [46, 9]—the classical view
is that, any definite set X has a definite ω-power, i.e. set XN of ω-sequences in X . Many adherents of this
view believe also that XN satisfies Dependent Choice, i.e. that for any x ∈ X and entire1 relation R from X
to X , there is s∈XN such that s0 = x and ∀n∈N. R(sn, sn+1). These beliefs spring from a “most liberal”
conception of ω-sequences as consisting of arbitrary choices. Let us accept them and continue.
1A relation R from X to Y is entire when for every x∈X there is y∈Y such that R(x, y).
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• Third order arithmetical sentences, such as the Continuum Hypothesis, quantify over P(2N). While some
people (call them ω-powerists) believe in all the above but not in P(2N)—see e.g. [36, Section 3.2.3]—the
classical view is that any definite set has a definite powerset. This is equivalent to saying that, for any definite
sets X and Y , the function set Y X is definite.2 Many adherents of this view believe also that Y X satisfies the
Axiom of Choice, i.e. that for any entire relation R from X to Y , there is f ∈Y X such that ∀x∈X.R(x, f(x)).
These beliefs (to paraphrase Bernays [3]) spring from a “most liberal” conception of functions or subsets as
consisting of arbitrary choices. Let us accept them and continue.
• Recall next the definition of the cumulative hierarchy. It associates to each ordinal α a set Vα by transfinite
recursion:
Vα+1
def
= PVα
If α is a limit, Vα
def
=
⋃
β<α Vβ
In particular, V0
def
= ∅
For example, consider the ordinal ω1. (It can be implemented as the set of well-ordered subsets of N, modulo
isomorphism.) Is Vω1 definite? The classical view—that, for any definite ordinal α, the set Vα is definite—may
be argued by induction on α as follows. For the successor case: any definite set has a definite powerset. For
the limit case: given a definite set I, and for each i ∈ I a definite set Ai, surely the union
⋃
i∈I Ai is definite.
Let us accept this argument and continue.
• ZFC has sentences that quantify over the ordinals. To emphasize: over all the ordinals, however large. That
is a “most liberal” conception. Is it definite? Arguably not, because of the Burali-Forti paradox: the totality
of all ordinals is itself well-ordered, with an order-type too large to belong to it. This powerful argument led
Parsons to describe the language of ZFC as “systematically ambiguous” [30], and was taken up by Dummett [7,
pages 316–317]:
The Burali-Forti paradox ensures that no definite totality comprises everything intuitively recog-
nisable as an ordinal number, where a definite totality is one over which quantification always yields
a statement that is determinately true or false.
However, it was rejected by Boolos [4] and Cartwright [6], who held that quantifying over the ordinals does
not imply that they form a totality.3
To summarize: we have accepted the classical view that (for example) the set Vω1 is definite and, by the Axiom
of Choice, well-orderable. But we have not accepted that quantification over the ordinals is definite. Since we
believe in many particular sets, such as Vω1 , our view may be called particularism. Other names given to it, or to
similar views, are “restricted platonism” [3, 28], “liberal intuitionism” [35] and “Zermelian potentialism” [1]—see
the discussion in [13, Section 4.3].
2.2 ZFC and purity
Recall next that ZFC adopts the following assumptions.
• Everything is a set. This rules out, for example, urelements and primitive ordered pairs.
• Membership is well-founded. This rules out, for example, sets a such that a = {a}, known as “Quine atoms”.
We call them purity assumptions. They can be combined into the statement Everything is a well-founded pure set,
where “pure” means that every element, and every element of an element, etc., is a set. The significance of these
assumptions depends on how we read quantifiers in ZFC.
• The full-blown interpretation of ∀x is “for any thing x whatsoever”. On this reading, ZFC denies the existence
of urelements and Quine atoms, which makes it unsound if an urelement or Quine atom does in fact exist
(whatever that means).
• The pure interpretation of ∀x is “for any well-founded pure set x”. On this reading, ZFC neither denies nor
affirms the existence of urelements and Quine atoms. It simply refrains from speaking about them.
2To justify (⇒), take Y X
def
= {r∈P(X × Y ) | ∀x∈X.∃!y∈Y.〈x, y〉 ∈ r}. To justify (⇐), take PX
def
=
{{x∈X | f(x) = 1} | f ∈{0, 1}X}.
3Even for those who hold this view, it is hard to deny that quantifying over classes of ordinals, as in Morse-Kelley class theory,
implies that the ordinals form a totality. And harder still for higher levels of class.
2
Each interpretation raises a question.
• Is quantification over all things definite? That seems implausible. For example, it is hard to believe that the
question “Are there precisely seven urelements?” has an objectively correct answer.
• Is quantification over the well-founded pure sets definite? The answer is yes if and only if quantification over
the ordinals is definite.4
A full-blown totalist believes in quantification over all things. A pure totalist does not believe this, but does believe
in quantification over the well-founded pure sets, or equivalently over the ordinals.
2.3 Set theory for particularists
We can now state the problem. ZFC is a set theory for pure totalists, in the sense that pure totalists (reading it
purely) would view its sentences as bivalent and its theorems as true. What would be a set theory for particularists
(i.e. us), in this sense? Such a theory would enable us to state and prove facts about particular sets, e.g. “The set Vω1
is well-orderable”, but prevent us from forming sentences that quantify over all sets (“Every set is well-orderable”)
or all ordinals (“Ordinal addition is associative”) or all things (“Everything is equal to itself”).
This paper presents a system meeting these requirements called TOPS—short for “Theory Of Particular Sets”.
It differs from ZFC in two substantive ways: it avoids unrestricted quantification, and does not adopt the purity
assumptions. The two points of difference are, in principle, orthogonal, but the purity assumptions are needed in
ZFC to make the quantifiers intelligible to pure totalists. In a system where quantifiers are always restricted, they
are not needed.
3 The language of TOPS
3.1 Informal account
We begin by informally introducing the TOPS notation. To this end, let T be the totality of all things. It may
contain urelements, Quine atoms, inaccessible cardinals, measurable cardinals, etc. Let S (a subcollection of T) be
the totality of all sets.
The TOPS notation is listed as follows; most of it is familiar.
1. Let a be a thing. We write IsSet(a) to say that a is a set.
2. Let A be a set and b a thing. We write b ∈ A to say that b is an element of A.
3. Let A and B be sets. We say that A is included in B, written A ⊆ B, when every element of A is in B.
4. We write ∅ for the empty set.
5. Let A and B be sets. We write A ∪B for the union of A and B.
6. Let A be a set and (B(a))a∈A a family of sets. We write
⋃
a∈AB(a) for the union of the family.
7. Let A be a set and P a predicate on it. We write {x∈A | P (x)} for the set of x ∈ A satisfying P .
8. Let a be a thing.
• The singleton {a} is the set whose sole element is a.
• For an assertion φ, the conditional singleton {a || φ} is {a} if φ is true and ∅ otherwise.
9. Let A be a set.
• The range of a function f : A→ T is written {f(x) | x∈A}.
• For a predicate P on A, the range of a function f : {x ∈ A | P (x)} → T is written {f(x) | x∈A | P (x)}.
10. Let A be a singleton set. Its unique element is written UE(A).
4To justify (⇐), note that the quantifier “for any well-founded pure set x” is equivalent to “for any ordinal α and any x∈Vα”, since
any well-founded pure set belongs to Vα, where α is the successor of its rank. To justify (⇒), use von Neumann’s implementation of
the ordinals as the transitive pure sets that are well-ordered by membership.
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Terms r, s, t, A,B ::= x | ∅ | A ∪B |
⋃
a∈AB(a) | {r || φ} | UE(A)
| IR(s/x.r) | WR
x,y.φ/z,Y.r
∈A (s) | PA
Propositional formulas φ, ψ ::= False | True | φ ∨ ψ | φ ∧ ψ | φ⇒ ψ | ¬φ
| ∃x∈A. φ | ∀x∈A. φ | s = t
| IsSet(A) | s ∈ A | Wx,y.φ
∈A (s)
Figure 1: Syntax of TOPS
11. Let a be a thing and F : T → T a function, which may be written x.F (x). The iterative reach of F on a,
written IR(a/F ), is the set {fn(a) | n ∈ N}.
12. Let A be a set and R a relation on A, which may be written x, y.R(x, y).
• We write WR∈A(a) when a is an R-well-founded element of A. This property is generated inductively
by the following rule: for a ∈ A, if every b ∈ A such that R(b, a) is R-well-founded, then so is a. By
Dependent Choice, an element a of A is R-well-founded iff there is no sequence (an)n∈N of elements of
A such that a0 = a and ∀n∈N. R(an+1, an).
• Let F : A×S→ T be a function, which may be written z, Y.F (z, Y ). For any R-well-founded element a
of A, we use well-founded recursion to define a thing written WR
R/F
∈A (a). Here is the recursive definition:
WR
R/F
∈A (a)
def
= F (a, {WR
R/F
∈A (x) | x∈A | R(x, a)})
13. Let A be a set. Its powerset, written PA, is the set of all subsets of A.
To ensure that our notation is defined in all cases, we adopt the following conventions.
1. Nonsense denotes the empty set. For a set A, we take
• UE(A) to be ∅ if A is not singleton
• WR
R/F
∈A (a) to be ∅ if a is not an R-well-founded element of A.
For an assertion φ and thing a, we say that φ is a Nonsense Convention prerequisite for a, written φ _NC a,
when ¬φ implies a = ∅. This can also be stated in a positive way: either φ is true, or a is a set such that, if
it is inhabited, then φ is true.
2. Non-sets are treated like the empty set. Wherever the notation expects a set, any non-set provided is tacitly
replaced by ∅. For example, if a is not a set, we take
• the statement b ∈ a to be false
• the statement a ⊆ b to be true
• Pa to be {∅}.
Likewise, for a set A and family of things (b(a))a∈A, we take
⋃
a∈A b(a) to be
⋃
a∈C b(a), where C is the set
of a ∈ A such that b(a) is a set.
3.2 Formal syntax
We now present the syntax formally. Let Vars be an infinite set of variables, written x, y,X, Y, . . .. The syntax of
terms and that of propositional formulas are mutually inductively defined in Figure 1. We usually use a lowercase
letter to suggest a thing, an uppercase one to suggest a set, and a calligraphic one (e.g. A) to suggest a set of sets.
But this is just for the sake of readability; the system does not distinguish these.
A declaration context γ is a finite subset of Vars. We define nil
def
= ∅ (it may be written as nothing) and
γ, x
def
= γ ∪ {x}. We write
• γ ⊢t t to say that t is a term over γ, i.e. a term whose free variables are all in γ
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(x ∈ γ)
γ ⊢t x γ ⊢t ∅
γ ⊢t A γ ⊢t B
γ ⊢t A ∪B
γ ⊢t A γ, x ⊢t B
γ ⊢t
⋃
x∈A
B
γ ⊢t r γ ⊢p φ
γ ⊢t {r || φ}
γ ⊢t A
γ ⊢t UE(A)
γ ⊢t s γ, x ⊢t r
γ ⊢t IR(s/x.r)
γ ⊢t A γ, x, y ⊢p φ γ, z, Y ⊢t r γ ⊢t s
γ ⊢t WR
x,y.φ/z,Y.r
∈A (s)
γ ⊢t A
γ ⊢t PA
γ ⊢p False γ ⊢p True
γ ⊢p φ γ ⊢p ψ
γ ⊢p φ ∨ ψ
γ ⊢p φ γ ⊢p ψ
γ ⊢p φ ∧ ψ
γ ⊢p φ γ ⊢p ψ
γ ⊢p φ⇒ ψ
γ ⊢p φ
γ ⊢p ¬φ
γ ⊢t A γ, x ⊢p φ
γ ⊢p ∃x∈A. φ
γ ⊢t A γ, x ⊢p φ
γ ⊢p ∀x∈A. φ
γ ⊢t s γ ⊢t t
γ ⊢p s = t
γ ⊢t A
γ ⊢p IsSet(A)
γ ⊢t s γ ⊢t A
γ ⊢p s ∈ A
γ ⊢t s γ ⊢t A γ, x, y ⊢p φ
γ ⊢p Wx,y.φ
∈A (s)
Figure 2: Terms and propositional formulas in context
• γ ⊢p φ to say that φ is a propositional formula over γ.
These two judgements are defined by mutual induction in Figure 2.
As usual, we identify terms up to renaming of bound variables (α-equivalence). We write φ[t/x] and s[t/x] for
the capture-avoiding substitution of t for x in φ and in s respectively.
A sentence is a closed propositional formula, so ⊢p φ says that φ is a sentence.
4 Definition of TOPS
4.1 Sequents
We formulate TOPS using Natural Deduction [33], which is a convenient framework for proofs in general, but
especially for proofs involving restricted quantification and nested dependencies, as dependent type theory has
shown [22].
In the middle of a Natural Deduction proof, an assertion is made subject to some hypotheses and variable
declarations. This information can be presented as a sequent. For example, given formulas and terms
⊢p φ0
⊢t A
x ⊢p φ1
x ⊢t B
x, y ⊢t C
x, y, z ⊢p ψ
the following is a sequent:
φ0, x :A, φ1, y :B, z :C ⊢ ψ
It is read: “Assuming φ0, and x in A, and φ1, and y in B, and z in C, we assert ψ.” Thus it has the same meaning
as the sentence
φ0 ⇒ ∀x∈A. (φ1 ⇒ ∀y∈B. ∀z∈C.ψ)
The part of a sequent that appears to the left of the ⊢ symbol is called a logical context. Let us now make this
precise.
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Definition 1 We define the set of logical contexts, and to each of these we associate
• a declaration context Decl(Γ)
• and a list Hyp(Γ) of formulas over Decl(Γ), called hypotheses,
inductively as follows.
• nil is a logical context (it may be written as nothing), with
Decl(nil)
def
= nil
Hyp(nil)
def
= the empty list
• If Γ is a logical context and x 6∈ Decl(Γ) and Decl(Γ) ⊢t A, then Γ, x :A is a logical context, with
Decl(Γ, x :A)
def
= Decl(Γ), x
Hyp(Γ, x :A)
def
= Hyp(Γ), x∈A
• If Γ is a logical context and Decl(Γ) ⊢p φ, then Γ, φ is a logical context, with
Decl(Γ, φ)
def
= Decl(Γ)
Hyp(Γ, φ)
def
= Hyp(Γ), φ
Definition 2 A sequent, written Γ ⊢ ψ, consists of
• a logical context Γ
• and a formula ψ over Decl(Γ), called the conclusion.
Below (Definition 3) we represent a sentence φ as the sequent ⊢ φ.
4.2 Abbreviations
We shall introduce some abbreviations to aid readability.
For n ∈ N, an n-ary abstracted term is a term F that may use additional variables z0, . . . , zn−1 not in Vars. It
is said to be over γ when all its free variables other than these are in γ. Given terms ~t = t0, . . . , tn−1 we write
F (~t)
def
= F [t0/z0, . . . , tn−1/zn−1]
If F and ~t are over γ then so is F (~t). We likewise define P (~t), where P is an n-ary abstracted propositional formula.
We often abbreviate ~x. F (~x) as F and ~x. P (~x) as P .
We write A0 ∪ · · · ∪ An−1 and φ0 ∨ · · · ∨ φn−1 and φ0 ∧ · · · ∧ φn−1 in the usual way. For n = 0 these are ∅ and
False and True respectively, and for n > 3 we choose some arrangement of parentheses.
We make the following abbreviations.
φ⇔ ψ
def
= (φ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ φ)
∃!x∈A.P (x)
def
= ∃x∈A. (P (x) ∧ ∀y∈A. (P (y)⇒ y = x))
A ⊆ B
def
= ∀x∈A. x ∈ B
{x ∈ A | P (x)}
def
=
⋃
x∈A{x || P (x)}
{r}
def
= {r || True}
{r0, . . . , rn−1}
def
= {r0} ∪ · · · ∪ {rn−1}
{F (x) | x∈A}
def
=
⋃
x∈A{F (x)}
{F (x, y) | x∈A, y∈B(x)}
def
=
⋃
x∈A
⋃
y∈B(x){F (x, y)} etc.
{F (x) | x∈A | P (x)}
def
=
⋃
x∈A{F (x) || P (x)}
{F (x, y) | x∈A, y∈B(x) | P (x, y)}
def
=
⋃
x∈A
⋃
y∈B(x){F (x, y) || P (x, y)} etc.
A ∩B
def
= {x∈A | x ∈ B}
ιx∈A.P (x)
def
= UE({x∈A | P (x)})
⋃
A
def
=
⋃
X∈AX
φ _NC r
def
= φ ∨ (IsSet(r) ∧ ∀x ∈ r. φ)
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φ appears in Hyp(Γ)
(Hypothesis)
Γ ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ False
(False E)
Γ ⊢ ψ
(True I)
Γ ⊢ True
Γ ⊢ φ
(∨IL)
Γ ⊢ φ ∨ φ′
Γ ⊢ φ′
(∨IR)
Γ ⊢ φ ∨ φ′
Γ ⊢ φ ∨ φ′ Γ, φ ⊢ ψ Γ, φ′ ⊢ ψ
(∨E)
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ Γ ⊢ φ′
(∧I)
Γ ⊢ φ ∧ φ′
Γ ⊢ φ ∧ φ′
(∧EL)
Γ ⊢ φ
Γ ⊢ φ ∧ φ′
(∧ER)
Γ ⊢ φ′
Γ, φ ⊢ ψ
(⇒I)
Γ ⊢ φ⇒ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ⇒ ψ Γ ⊢ φ
(⇒E)
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ Γ ⊢ ¬φ
(¬Quodlibet)
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ, φ ⊢ ψ Γ, ¬φ ⊢ ψ
(¬Cases)
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ t ∈ A Γ ⊢ P (t)
(∃∈I)
Γ ⊢ ∃x∈A.P (x)
Γ ⊢ ∃x∈A.P (x) Γ, x :A, P (x) ⊢ ψ
(∃∈E)
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ, x :A ⊢ P (x)
(∀∈I)
Γ ⊢ ∀x∈A.P (x)
Γ ⊢ ∀x∈A.P (x) Γ ⊢ t ∈ A
(∀∈E)
Γ ⊢ P (t)
(=I)
Γ ⊢ s = s
Γ ⊢ r = s Γ ⊢ P (r)
(=E)
Γ ⊢ P (s)
Figure 3: Logical rules
Here and throughout the paper, fresh variables are used for binding. For example, in the definition of ∃!x∈A.P (x)
above, y must be fresh for P and not be x.
4.3 Provability
TOPS consists of logical rules (Figure 3) and axiom schemes (Figure 4), which together define provability of sequents.
Each rule and scheme refers to a logical context Γ. All (abstracted) terms and formulas mentioned are assumed to
be over Decl(Γ). The logical rules are the usual introduction (I) and elimination (E) rules of Natural Deduction,
adapted to restricted quantification. As there is no standard set of Natural Deduction rules for negation, the
¬Quodlibet and ¬Cases rules have been chosen for convenience and symmetry.
To complete the definition of Closed TOPS, we define provability of sentences.
Definition 3 A theorem is a sentence φ such that the sequent ⊢ φ is provable.
4.4 Subsystems
Certain subsystems of TOPS may be of special interest. For example:
• the arithmetical fragment, which excludes W, WR, powerset and Choice
• the W -arithmetical fragment, which excludes powerset and Choice
• the intuitionistic fragment, which excludes negation and Choice
• TOPS without Choice.
Our formulation of TOPS has been arranged so as to keep these subsystems self-contained. However, this is a
matter of taste; other presentations are possible and may have their own advantages.
7
Sethood
(Set Membership) Γ ⊢ s ∈ A ⇒ IsSet(A)
(Set Extensionality) Γ ⊢ (IsSet(A) ∧ IsSet(B) ∧ A ⊆ B ∧B ⊆ A) ⇒ A = B
Empty set
(∅ Set) Γ ⊢ IsSet(∅)
(∅ Element) Γ ⊢ t ∈ ∅ ⇔ False
Binary union
(∪ Set) Γ ⊢ IsSet(A ∪B)
(∪ Element) Γ ⊢ t ∈ A ∪B ⇔ (t ∈ A ∨ t ∈ B)
Indexed union
(
⋃
∈
Set) Γ ⊢ IsSet(
⋃
x∈AB(x))
(
⋃
∈
Element) Γ ⊢ t ∈
⋃
x∈AB(x) ⇔ ∃x∈A. t ∈ B(x)
Conditional singleton
(CS Set) Γ ⊢ IsSet({r || φ})
(CS Element) Γ ⊢ t ∈ {r || φ} ⇔ (t = r ∧ φ)
Unique element
(UE NC) Γ ⊢ (∃!x∈A.True) _NC UE(A)
(UE Specification) Γ ⊢ (∃!x∈A.True) ⇒ UE(A) ∈ A
Iterative reach
(IR Set) Γ ⊢ IsSet(IR(s/F ))
(IR Base Generation) Γ ⊢ s ∈ IR(s/F )
(IR Step Generation) Γ ⊢ t ∈ IR(s/F ) ⇒ F (t) ∈ IR(s/F )
(IR Induction) Γ ⊢ (P (s) ∧ (∀x∈ IR(s/F ). (P (x)⇒ P (F (x)))) ∧ t ∈ IR(s/F )) ⇒ P (t)
Well-founded elementhood
(W∈ Generation) Γ ⊢ (r ∈ A ∧ ∀y∈A.R(y, x)⇒WR∈A(y)) ⇒ W
R
∈A(r)
(W∈ Induction) Γ ⊢ ((∀x∈A. (∀y∈A. (R(y, x) ⇒ P (y)))⇒ P (x)) ∧ WR∈A(t)) ⇒ P (t)
Well-founded recursion
(WR∈ NC) Γ ⊢ W
R
∈A(s) _NC WR
R/F
∈A (s)
(WR∈ Specification) Γ ⊢ WR∈A(s) ⇒ WR
R/F
∈A (s) = F (s, {WR
R/F
∈A (x) | x∈A | R(x, s)})
Powerset
(P Set) Γ ⊢ IsSet(PA)
(P Element) Γ ⊢ B ∈ PA ⇔ (IsSet(B) ∧B ⊆ A)
Choice
(Choice) Γ ⊢ ((∀x∈A. ∀w∈A.∀y∈B(x) ∩B(w). x = w) ∧ (∀x∈A. ∃y∈B(x).True))
⇒ ∃Y ∈P
⋃
x∈AB(x). ∀x∈A. ∃!y∈B(x). y ∈ Y
Figure 4: Axiom schemes of TOPS
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γ Theorem over γ
X If X is a set, then X is well-orderable.
x, y, z If x, y, z are ordinals, then (x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z).
x x = x.
Figure 5: Some theorems of Open TOPS
5 Open TOPS
As we have seen, TOPS allows us to prove sentences. For a declaration context γ, we shall give a variant of TOPS
called TOPS over γ allowing us to prove formulas over γ. These systems are collectively called Open TOPS.
We first define logical context over γ and sequent over γ the same way as in Section 4.1, except that we replace
Decl with Declγ . The definition of the latter differs only in the following clause:
Declγ(nil)
def
= γ
Provability of sequents is defined as in Section 4.3. Finally, a theorem over γ is a formula φ such that ⊢ φ is provable.
Some examples are shown in Figure 5.
To make sense of TOPS over γ from a particularist viewpoint, let ρ be a γ-valuation, which associates to each
x ∈ γ a thing ρ(x) ∈ T. Note that ρ(x) may be an urelement, a Quine atom, an inaccessible cardinal, a measurable
cardinal, etc. With respect to ρ, every formula or sequent over γ is bivalent, every instance of an axiom scheme
is true, and every instance of a logical rule preserves truth; so every provable sequent and every theorem over γ is
true.
Accordingly, although T is not fixed, and we are free to admit to it anything we find credible and desirable, we
would not admit things that violate a theorem of Open TOPS. For example, we would not admit a set that is not
well-orderable, ordinals on which addition is not associative, or a thing that is not equal to itself. We deem such
properties impossible, as they contradict the beliefs we have accepted.
6 Related work
6.1 General background
The following is just a selection, as the relevant literature is large.
• For a wide-ranging account of set-theoretic belief, see Maddy [20].
• For recent discussion of unrestricted quantification and the totality of sets, see e.g. the anthology [37] and
the overviews [10, 44]. These issues have been considered in many contexts, such as reflection principles [47],
categoricity theorems [5, 15, 21], modal logic [14] and categorical semantics [43, 2] .
• Following [17], it is usual to classify sentences by their number of alternations of unrestricted quantifiers.
Mathias [23] extensively analyzes subsystems of ZFC, such as the theories of Mac Lane [19] and Kripke-Platek,
that use this classification to limit (in various ways) the permissible use of Separation and/or Replacement.
These are classical first-order theories, but other authors restrict also the use of excluded middle [45, 35, 34,
48, 11, 12, 8, 36, 41]. The legitimacy of classical vs intuitionstic reasoning for the totality of sets is further
discussed in [16, 31, 18, 39].
• The formation of sequents in TOPS is adapted from dependent type theory. Indeed, extensional dependent
type theory [22], without universes, can be seen as a subsystem of TOPS.
• Set theories in which terms and propositional formulas are simultaneously defined can be seen e.g. in [42, 29,
34].
• The important role of well-founded recursion in set theory has been argued e.g. in [49, 23, 38].
• The convention that “nonsense denotes the empty set” is followed by the proof assistants Isabelle/ZF [32,
Section 7.2] and Metamath [40].
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6.2 Comparison with Mayberry’s Local ZF
After writing the first version of this paper, the author learned of the system “Local ZF” studied by Mayberry [26,
25], with variants appearing in [27, 24]. It clearly proves the same sentences (modulo notational differences) as
TOPS. Therefore the following valuable results about Local ZF given in [26] apply also to TOPS.
• It has a conservative extension that provides global choice function.
• It has a further conservative extension that allows formulas with unrestricted quantification, governed by
intuitionistic logic without induction and various set-theoretic axioms.
• It can be embedded in a weak fragment of ZFC, whose consistency is provable in ZFC.
Despite the close similarity, Local ZF differs from TOPS in several ways. It adopts the purity assumptions, unlike
TOPS, and lacks the modular arrangement mentioned in Section 4.4. More importantly, it is not quite a theory of
particular sets, as it uses open formulas rather than sequents.
To see the problem this causes, recall first the conventional understanding of open formula systems. A formula’s
denotation is given with respect to a valuation, i.e. map Vars → T. A universally true formula is one that is true
with respect to every valuation. A theory is deemed acceptable when each axiom is universally true and each
inference rule preserves universal truth.
For example, consider the following Hilbert-style counterpart of our ∀∈I rule:
ψ ⇒ (x∈A⇒ φ(x))
x fresh for ψ,A, φ
ψ ⇒ ∀x∈A. φ(x)
(Rule III(3) in [26] is similar.) For a totalist, it clearly preserves universal truth. But for a particularist, who doubts
the notion of universal truth, it is hard to see what kind of truth this rule can be said to preserve.
By contrast, the logical rules for TOPS preserve not universal truth but simply truth—that is what makes them
immediately convincing. Sequents are bivalent just as sentences are, because every variable is declared. Specifically,
the premise of the ∀∈I rule in Figure 3 would not be a sequent if x :A were replaced by x∈A.
What about Open TOPS? The reason TOPS over γ provides an acceptable way of reasoning about a particular
γ-valuation ρ is that each axiom is true with respect to ρ, and each rule preserves truth with respect to ρ. No other
valuation need be considered.
Thus, whereas one can present first-order logic either in Hilbert style or via Natural Deduction, this is not the
case for TOPS. The latter must be presented via Natural Deduction, distinguishing between a declaration x :A and
a mere hypothesis of the form x∈A, in order to have a notion of truth that every rule preserves.
7 Conclusion
Despite the popularity of ZFC as a set-theoretic foundation, the Burali-Forti paradox (for example) raises serious
concerns about its meaningfulness. As an alternative, we propose TOPS, a Natural Deduction system that avoids
the problem by speaking only about particular sets. This allows us to maintain, as particularists, that its sentences
are bivalent and its theorems objectively true. An example theorem is the well-orderability of Vω1 . Theorems of
Open TOPS have a different character; they lack objective meaning but are true with respect to any valuation.
Acknowledgements I thank Ehud Hrushovski, Adrian Mathias and Norman Megill for helpful comments.
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